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Abstract and Keywords
In recent years social scientists have been interested in the growth and transformation of 
global cities. These metropolises, which function as key command centers in global 
production networks, manifest many of the social, economic, and political tensions and 
inequities of neoliberal globalization. Their international appeal as sites of financial 
freedom and free trade frequently obscures the global city underbelly: practices of labor 
exploitation, racial discrimination, and migrant deferral. This chapter explores some of 
these global tensions, showing how they have shaped the strategies and technologies 
behind urban crime prevention, security, and policing. In particular, the chapter shows 
how certain populations perceived as risky become treated as pre-criminals: individuals 
in need of management and control before any criminal behavior has occurred. It is 
demonstrated further how the production of the pre-criminal can lead to dispossession, 
delay, and detention as well as to increasing gentrification and violence.
Keywords: global city, pre-crime, migration, policing, security, borders
I. Introduction
When Kathryn Steinle was shot by an irregular migrant in San Francisco in July 2015, it 
provoked a national debate about immigration policy and criminality. One of the key 
questions to arise was the city’s role in the crime. The accused immigrant had been 
deported several times, had a criminal record, and was requested by ICE (Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement) to be held on a “detainer” to keep him in a San Francisco jail 
until federal authorities could arrive to take him. (He was incarcerated there for his 
illegal reentry into the country.) Owing to its “Due Process for All” ordinance of 2013, 
San Francisco is one of a number of metropolitan centers in the United States that offers 
some protection to people who are in the country illegally. As a “sanctuary city,” San 
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Francisco does not always comply with federal officials. If the immigrant has no violent 
felonies on record, for example, the city can refuse to honor immigration detainer 
requests from ICE. In this particular case, the arrestee had no violent crimes on record, 
and was released. As a result of this case, the House of Representatives passed the 
Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act, a bid to withhold funds from cities that don’t 
cooperate with federal immigration officials. The legislation was later blocked by the 
Senate.
This national case provides a good example of the growing tensions between global cities 
and other scales of jurisdiction. These tensions are sometimes with federal laws and 
policies (as the example just given demonstrates) and sometimes with the informal 
practices of rural regions and small towns, as in the case of fox hunting in England, and 
the recent shooting of a Black teenager in Ferguson, Missouri. Tensions are also frequent 
with various supranational actors and entities, including the European Union (EU), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN) and World Bank (Brenner 1999;
Isin 2013; Telò 2013), international human rights laws and conventions such as the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, and also with 
transnational organizations such as global real estate, global security firms, and bond-
rating agencies (Smith 2002; Mitchell and Beckett 2008). In addition to questions of local 
autonomy, decisions by these latter global agencies concerning urban credit worthiness 
and risk can have enormous impacts on the financial and physical health of a city and are 
frequently a source of great strife and contestation (Hackworth 2002; 2007).
Global cities experience these tensions the most, as they are centrally imbricated in 
larger systems of trade, finance, and the mass movements of people (both legal and 
irregular), yet they are often relatively powerless vis-à-vis the constitution of laws and 
policies that directly affect these processes and populations (Knox 1995; Taylor 1997;
Sassen 2001; Rennie-Short 2013). With rapid urbanization and neoliberal forms of 
globalization over the last four decades, these tensions have only increased. Neoliberal 
policies of austerity and privatization, orchestrated at national and supranational scales 
worldwide, put a tremendous strain on cities, which are forced to deal with the 
ramifications of these policies on the ground (Brenner and Theodore 2002). Among the 
urban effects are an increasing polarization of wealth, uneven development, 
gentrification, and spatial segregation, such that many scholars now describe 
contemporary global cities as composed of separate and unequal parts, hence “dual 
cities” or “divided cities” (Hamnett 2003; Scholar 2006).
In addition to struggles between urban and national scales of authority and control, there 
are increasing tensions between cities as well. David Harvey (1989) has noted that one of 
the many repercussions of neoliberal globalization for cities has been a shift from 
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managerialism to entrepreneurialism. Cities are increasingly governed by the logic of 
competition, in which they must become more and more entrepreneurial in order to 
garner the capital and resources they need in the context of declining federal support. As 
a result, they enter into increasingly ferocious struggles with one another over 
progressively scarce resources. Each urban metropolis seeks to attract capital and global 
attention—from business, mass tourism, real estate, and sports events, molding its image 
and making concessions and adaptations to fit what is perceived as desired by global 
actors and institutions. These may come in the form of tax breaks or the promotion of an 
urban atmosphere and environment conducive to attracting the “creative class,” such as 
endorsed by the scholar Richard Florida (2004); they may come in the form of a gentrified 
downtown and attractive waterfront—an urban revitalization strategy employed by a 
number of cities, from Baltimore, Maryland, to Glasgow, Scotland; or they may come in 
the form of new museums, catchy slogans, or sports arenas with the latest designs in 
luxury boxes.
One thing that all competing global cities and megacities share in the neoliberal era is 
the imperative to remain networked—to be an indispensable connecting node in a larger 
configuration of commerce, finance, and information: a base for transnational 
headquarters and a hub for global economic and political institutions. Examples abound 
of urban centers that met with disaster when they became economically and politically 
disconnected as a result of shifts in the form and logic of capital accumulation (e.g., from 
industrial manufacturing to finance-based economies). For a global city to remain 
economically viable, it must remain relevant to the wider global economy.
The imperative to connect leads to tensions within cities and between cities. The spaces 
of connection are not necessarily contiguous, and it is possible to see pockets of global 
connection juxtaposed with completely isolated neighborhoods in most global cities and 
megacities worldwide (Sassen 2001). This discontinuity represents both a threat and an 
opportunity for the global elite. So-called dual cities are composed of enclaves of wealth 
and privilege, and neighborhoods that are poor, isolated, or abandoned. The latter spaces 
can constitute a risk to nodal flows and to feelings of physical security and urban identity 
for the more privileged. But in certain circumstances they also constitute an opportunity 
for this same group vis-à-vis the creation of a rent gap, accumulation by dispossession, 
and cycles of reinvestment and gentrification (Smith 1996, 2008; Harvey 2006).
While the greatest risk for cities in the contemporary era is the possibility of isolation 
from the global economy, spaces of disconnection within global cities can be moments of 
both risk and opportunity for financial investors. Thus to understand its role in the global 
city, crime must be seen not as an isolatable act but as part and parcel of these larger 
social and spatial relations and scalar tensions. During the 1970s such an approach was 
developed by what is known as the new, radical, or Marxist school of criminology 
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(Greenberg 2010).  This school rejected dominant paradigms in the discipline, including 
official or legal definitions of criminality. In rejecting these it sought to reframe crime—
its origins, classifications, and punishment systems—as the outcome of capitalism’s 
uneven conditions and spatial effects, in particular, the relations between dominant and 
subordinate classes. In this view, how crime is categorized, contained, and controlled 
works to the advantage of elites and to the disadvantage of the economically and socially 
marginalized.
The radical school of criminology has been criticized for taking a simplistic and 
deterministic view of class dominance, for being empirically unverifiable, and for focusing 
too heavily on economic factors in criminality while ignoring others (see Sparks [1980]
for one of the most influential critiques). Nevertheless, this approach remains useful in 
theorizing crime in the context of the global city, as it connects local practices to a wider 
set of material and socio-spatial conflicts and movements. For example, it can help link 
ideologies about criminality and the policing of urban crime to the wider processes that 
constitute the global economy and its uneven development on the ground (Graham 2004;
2011; Davis 2006; 2007; Wacquant 2007).
In urban sites, such as the twentieth-century global city, capitalism depends on “creative 
destruction”—the annihilation of existing relations of production and space to make room 
for new capital ventures, higher levels of productivity, and an extension of the spatial 
limits of capital (Harvey 2001). Insofar as it is defined as an attack on property or on 
other (neo)liberal notions of right, crime provides the rationale for investments in new 
methods and technologies of defense, establishing larger geographies of security and 
surveillance that help maintain the functioning of a growing economy. It is for this reason 
that Marx (1986, p. 321) goes so far as to suggest that crime, as creative destruction, 
helps lay the conditions for the emergence of the world market.
This is why crime must always exist in capitalist societies. Although it poses a threat to 
existing relations (and thus must be policed), in the act of posing such a threat it extends 
the limits and boundaries of capitalism itself (and thus must not be policed out of 
existence). Increasingly, in the global city especially, this tension is projected onto the 
figure of the migrant, as well as those internal populations positioned as different or 
“foreign” to the perceived norms of a given society. As Aas (2013) and others have 
argued, today we are witnessing a blurring of the line between the foreigner and the 
criminal (see also Bigo 2005). This is because, from the vantage of Marxist criminology, 
the criminal is already foreign. Under capitalism, crime entails an attack on property and 
is thus framed as trespass—the breach of another’s space. To study migration and crime, 
then, is to partake in what Pickering, Bosworth, and Aas (2014) have called a 
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“criminology of mobility,” which situates the subject among practices of inclusion and 
exclusion, of border control (see also Amoore, Marmura, and Salter 2008).
In this chapter we examine the relations between contemporary urbanization and crime, 
particularly the manner in which certain populations such as migrants and others coded 
as foreign or “other” to dominant groups, are positioned as criminals—often before any 
“criminal act” has occurred. These figures of “potential deviance” or “precrime” distort 
and obscure clear-cut legal categories, definitions, and rights, creating new targets of 
governance and new spaces of management, policing, and control (Mitchell 2009; Lippert 
2014). We also investigate how the practices of identifying or defining certain 
populations as deviant create new opportunities for urban dispossession, gentrification, 
and other forms of creative destruction in the global city.
In the following section we locate these defining and ordering practices geographically by 
probing the ongoing tensions between different scales of jurisdiction as cities, nations, 
and global actors vie for the management of these spaces and populations. Predominant 
among these struggles are the control of transnational flows—the mobility or immobility 
of both people and goods as the global city morphs into the logistical city in the twenty-
first century. Who exactly is defined and criminalized as an irregular migrant and why? 
Why and how are certain entities such as commodities constantly enabled and enhanced 
vis- à -vis the free and unhindered movement across borders, while other bodies such as 
human workers are biometrically managed, surveyed, and detained on the same 
journeys?
II. The Global City, the Migrant, and Crime
The paradox of the criminalized-but-necessary migrant is found throughout the world. 
There are, for example, over 11 million undocumented workers in the United States, 
comprising 5.1 percent of the nation’s labor force (Passel and Cohn 2015). Irregular 
immigrants are often positioned in menial, dangerous, and poorly paid forms of 
employment in global cities; jobs that are often considered undesirable by those able to 
compete in an open labor market. Rendered illegal and precarious, these workers provide 
a source of cheap labor in industries such as agriculture (where undocumented migrants 
make up approximately a quarter of the workforce), construction (where 14 percent of 
the workforce is undocumented), and domestic work (where at least 35 percent of 
workers are noncitizens) (Burnham and Theodore 2012; Passel and Cohn 2015).
When detained for their irregular entry and/or illegal labor, undocumented immigrants 
also provide a major source of profit for private prisons in the United States. Of the 
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400,000 immigrants detained annually by ICE (Simanski 2014) nearly half are held in 
private facilities (Longazel 2013). Since 2005, the two largest for-profit prison companies 
in the world—Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group, Inc.—have 
more than doubled their revenues from immigrant detention. Indeed, scholars argue that 
it was the upturn in immigrant detainment after 9/11 that rescued the private-prison 
industry from economic jeopardy (Díaz 2012; Longazel 2013). Without the criminalization 
and consequent devaluation of migrant labor, not only the private prison but the global 
city itself—its networks and hinterland—would cease to function or at least not function 
as profitably as it does currently.
In the Persian Gulf region, this highly profitable relationship between migrants forever 
positioned on the threshold of criminality is formalized in law through the kafala system. 
In this system of sponsorship, the legal status of unskilled migrant workers is tied to their 
sponsoring employer. Companies are held responsible for monitoring and policing their 
employees and are thus given the power to grant or deny legal standing. This system has 
had devastating effects on labor in the region. In contemporary Qatar, for example, under 
the kafala system migrant laborers from Nepal, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are 
building the infrastructure for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. In return for their labor in 
constructing this future “global city,” they have endured sordid living conditions, 
withheld wages, and a dangerous work environment. In 2012 and 2013 alone, 964 
workers were killed on the job (Gibson and Pattisson 2014).
These exploitative conditions are made possible by the structure of a legal system that 
positions migrant workers on the threshold of criminality. It links them to the status of 
pre-criminals, or what the theorist Agamben calls “bare life.”  Workers are rendered into 
bare life upon arrival, when their passports are often confiscated and they are denied the 
status of political beings. If they flee abuse, they may be detained, deported, or 
incarcerated. To leave the country voluntarily, they must obtain an exit visa from their 
sponsor. As a result, many migrants have become effectively trapped, working as 
“subhumans” to create the economic conditions in which, according to Forbes magazine, 
Doha, Qatar’s capital, is projected to become one of the world’s “best cities for business” 
in 2025 (Connor 2014).
The relationship between miserable labor conditions and economic prowess is not 
accidental. The legal conditions enabling major labor exploitation is what gives a global 
city like Doha or Dubai a competitive advantage over its rivals; it is what enables these 
cities to build the world’s tallest skyscraper or to accumulate the greatest capital 
reserves. It is because of this link, moreover, that local strategies of crime control (in this 
case concerning migrant workers) draw on, and reflect, the security of the global 
economy as a whole. This is the security, not just of the global city, but also of the 
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networked spaces in which these cities meet, and the sites where goods are exchanged. 
In the following section we look at some of these key sites.
A. The Logistical City, Commodity Circulation, and Risky Bodies
These networked sites include transport and logistics hubs, among other commodity 
exchange points. Dubai Logistics City (DLC), for example, is one of Dubai’s 27 economic 
free zones (Fernandes and Rodrigues 2009). It is adjacent to the Port of Jebel Ali, the 
ninth busiest container port in the world in terms of cargo traffic and the busiest port 
outside of East Asia (Salisbury 2015). In contrast to how migrant workers are detained, 
impeded, and prevented from leaving the country, DLC delivers a “business-friendly, free 
zone platform, offering state-of-the-art infrastructure and services” for the fluid and 
efficient circulation of commodities (Shekhar 2010). This capacity for speed—the speed of 
economic flows—is part of what makes Dubai such an attractive city for financial 
investment.
While heralded by UAE officials as the world’s first fully integrated multimodal logistics 
platform (Cowen 2014), DLC is the latest development in a logistics revolution that began 
in the 1960s and 1970s, occurring alongside the same economic shifts that led to the rise 
of global cities initially (Sparke 2013; Dicken 2015). Along with the transnational 
financial instruments that have emerged in the context of globalization (see Martin 2002;
Sinclair 2005; Hackworth 2007; Mitchell and Beckett 2008), advances in logistics 
provided a new set of apparatuses for calculating and reorganizing economic space.
Cowen (2014) has recently shown how these logistical apparatuses were made possible 
by, and helped naturalize, new practices of security and policing that blur the lines 
between the military and the market (see also Martin 2007). Novel business strategies 
like total cost analysis were combined, for example, with military innovations—most 
notably the standardized shipping container—to optimize the circulation of commodities.
The intertwining of economic and military strategies of circulation and control helped 
combat the long economic downturn that began in the 1970s. This was achieved by 
reducing labor time through the mechanization of port work, slashing circulation costs, 
and providing the material foundations for just-in-time systems of production. This post-
Fordist backlash was one of the many changing conditions of global production and 
circulation that enabled, and indeed required, the rise of so-called global cities, which 
began to operate as command and control centers for these increasingly fast-paced and 
complex functions (Harris 1994; Sassen 2001). At the same time, the management of 
trade corridors between urban centers—and the resulting standardization of movement, 
space, and infrastructure, soon recast the global city as a logistical city as well. Linked 
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together through these networked corridors of commodity and capital flows, such cities 
share a common body of policing tactics and strategies for immigration and crime 
control; these include forming impediments or obstructions to the free flow of risky, pre-
crime bodies, while paradoxically facilitating the movement of goods.
Crime is rewritten, thus, in the language of economic risk, and the criminal is resituated 
within geographies of production and circulation; these geographies erode, but 
simultaneously reconfigure, the boundaries of national territoriality. In working across 
these boundaries, logistical networks, and the speed of circulation they afford, produce a 
higher level of vulnerability, multiplying the points and linkages at which disruption may 
occur and at which national security may become compromised (Cowen 2014). Due to the 
threat of disruption to economic processes there emerges, alongside the logistics 
revolution, a system of supply-chain security—an assemblage of institutions, regulations, 
and technologies for monitoring and ensuring the seamless circulation of commodities 
and the subjects who handle or impede them. These include antiterrorist port security 
programs like the Container Security Initiative (CSI), biometric borders and surveillance 
systems such as the United States’ Transportation Worker Identification Credential, 
enterprise resource planning systems, and risk analytics like World Bank’s Logistics 
Performance Index (see Amoore and De Goede 2005; Amoore 2006).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Dubai is at the forefront of these developments. In 2004, its port 
authority was the first such entity in the Middle East to join the CSI (Jacobs and Hall 
2007). Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port has also received top awards from the Higher Committee for 
UAE Civil Seaports & Airports Security for adherence to security requirements, including 
providing specialist training to security teams and implementing the International Ship 
and Port Facility Security Code designed to detect security threats (Gulf News 2011;
World Maritime News 2012). Security apparatuses like these produce, while managing, 
the “pre-criminal”—those whose actions might constitute a risk to logistical flows, and 
who must be preemptively managed (Amoore and de Goede 2008; Amoore 2013;
Vaughan-Williams 2015). Any suspected or implied criminal activity—such as irregular 
migration—is reformulated as a threat to the global economy and thereby rendered an 
issue of national security. It is for this reason that supply-chain security muddies the 
boundaries between migration, war, crime, and terror, along with the technologies used 
to address them (Andreas and Price 2001; Berdal and Serrano 2002; Bigo 2005; Andreas 
and Nadelmann 2006; Martin 2007; Vaughan-Williams 2009; 2015; Aas 2013; Cowen 
2014).
The same process of securing the internal workforce supplies the state with programs 
and strategies for containing external threats like immigration. This helps explain the 
buildup of border-patrol policing and technology and also the manner in which 
transnational migration and the profile of “the foreigner” is made problematic in the 
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global city. In contrast to the unhindered flow of goods, migrants must pass through 
checkpoints and provide proof of their legal status. Often crossing the same borders as 
commodities, migrants pose a potential threat to this economic fluidity, and are thus 
rendered suspect of sabotage and other forms of criminal behavior. A recent example of 
this is the 2015 “immigration crisis” in the EU, which has disrupted supply chains 
throughout Europe. According to the International Air Cargo Association, the influx of 
refugees has increased wait times at border crossings, reduced bookings by customers, 
and lowered volumes for motor carriers. The financial impact of this has led to upturns in 
the criminalization of migrants, with logistics companies calling for additional 
immigration controls between states (Burnson 2015).
The criminalization of migrants around logistics practices is also often tinged with 
allegations of terrorism. This has been the case, especially since 9/11, for illegal 
stowaways on commercial transport, who are frequently couched in the language of 
national security. The overlapping nature of internal and external practices of security—
against the domestic worker and the foreign migrant—redefines criminality not just in 
terms of terrorism but also in juxtaposition to life itself (Dillon 2004; Duffield 2007). 
Crime is increasingly seen in terms of the obstruction of the free flow of goods across 
space and over borders, the continuation of which is perceived as paramount to the 
survival of the individual and of humanity. This perception is due to the fact that in 
executing supply-chain security, governments paradoxically deterritorialize national 
citizenship rights by placing their criminal targets in supranational spaces of exception, 
where such rights do not apply (Agamben 1998). This creates the conditions for new 
territorialities and forms of belonging, including a global citizenship (or bios) in 
opposition to the criminal-terrorist (or zoe). As a result, crimes against logistics turn out 
to be crimes against humanity, whose home is the global city. In the following section we 
examine some of the repercussions of these new territorialities and forms of belonging in 
the securitization of borders and migrants outside nation-state borders.
B. The Global City Offshore
State space is not dissolved in the global city but rather recalibrated and redrawn along 
the corridors of the global supply chain. Questions of crime and immigration are, as a 
result, increasingly removed from the traditional inside/outside logic of national 
territoriality. Instead, policing is pushed offshore, while military tactics are pulled inward 
(Kraska 2001; Pickering and Weber 2013; Wood 2014).
The transnational migrant, who is positioned at the nexus of these coercive forces, has 
come to define many of the strategies with which crime is framed and registered in and 
around the global city. Recent immigration policies offer evidence for how, in the last two 
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decades, borders of sovereignty have been pushed outward and relocated in the fractured 
spaces of exception and detention. Alison Mountz (2011) has provided a theoretically rich 
account of this. She shows how “front-end” border-enforcement practices in Australia, 
Canada, and the United States have functioned to deter asylum seekers from reaching 
sovereign territory. Interned on offshore spaces such as Christmas Island (Australia) or 
Guam (US)—migrants are placed in “temporal, spatial, and legal limbo between nation-
states,” unable to claim asylum and to receive the protections stipulated under the 1951 
UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (Mountz 2011, 
p. 119).
These islands are often home to military bases with facilities that can be converted for 
detention. The result is that migrants are subjected to state violence. They are “haunted” 
by the colonial histories of the landscape as well as by its present uses in coercion. Such 
violence establishes a continuous line between, and therefore naturalizes, the state’s 
imperial past and its imperial present. In this way, by mobilizing and extending borders 
outward to a “carceral archipelago” (Gregory 2004), and thus by disembodying 
themselves territorially, states secure, reinforce, and reproduce the firmness of their own 
boundaries—boundaries that are physical but also historical.
Offshore security acts furthermore as a proving ground for techniques and strategies for 
policing its territorial counterpart: the global city (Martin and Mitchelson 2009). Scholars 
have noted, for instance, how detention practices in island facilities like Guantánamo Bay 
mirror and co-constitute those normalized in prisons within the United States. (Davis 
2005; Carlton 2006; Carlton and McCulloch 2008; Gordon 2009). Such cross-pollination 
also occurs in the containment of crime itself. Since 2003, the US military has been using 
long-range acoustic devices (LRADS) for maritime security, particularly in repelling 
Somali pirates, as well as in other offshore defense operations. These “sound cannons” 
emit tones at decibels—as high as 162 dBA—that are above the average pain threshold 
for humans (130 dBA), often causing irreversible hearing loss. Since 2009 LRADs are now 
used domestically by police forces in the United States to disperse illegal protestors at 
events such as the G20 summit in Pittsburgh (Bradshaw 2013).
It is no accident that a weapon developed abroad has been used onshore to quash those 
who would challenge G20. The latter is the latest in a series of attempts after World War 
II—including the creation of the IMF, the World Bank, and what is now called the World 
Trade Organization—to internationally organize, optimize, and govern the forces of 
globalization (see, e.g., Postel-Vinay 2013, pp. 8–10). Functioning along these lines, front-
end security not only shores up the state but also the unhindered movement of circulating 
capital. By slowing down migrants and protestors on islands of detention or through 
noise, the other archipelago—that of the supply chain—is securitized and normalized. 
These archipelagos mark the ghostly underbelly of the global city; they form the 
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connective tissue that connects it to other urban nodes within the matrix of global 
capitalism. In the following section we investigate these forms of securitization further, 
asking, why is this happening in the contemporary moment? And why has it focused on, 
among others, the racialized bodies of migrants and domestic minorities?
III. Urbanization, Race, and Security
Answers to the questions “why now” can be found by examining the production of surplus 
populations in global cities and their hinterlands worldwide (see, e.g., Cooper 2008;
Mitchell 2009; McIntyre and Nast 2011; Merrill 2011; Tyner 2013). “Relative surplus 
population” is a term that refers to those workers that have been made (temporarily) 
superfluous and cast into the ranks of the unemployed. Such a population—in delimited 
and managed numbers—benefits capital accumulation because it provides an easily 
exploitable “reserve army of labor,” while simultaneously driving down the average cost 
of wages (Marx 1992, pp. 781–794). Castells (1977) has noted further how this social 
relationship is always also a spatial relationship, as these surplus populations most often 
exist in segregated or ghettoized sectors of the city and the nation. Existing at the 
margins of the city and the economy, however, surplus populations can also pose—or are 
framed as posing—a security threat for capitalism and the state. They absorb financial 
risk, while simultaneously manifesting physical risk through their embodied difference 
and spatial separation. These “embodied” differences are most readily identified in those 
populations seen as phenotypically and/or culturally different or “deviant” from the 
dominant groups in society.
A. Security, Space, and the Racialization of Urban Deviance
According to Spitzer (1975), deviance itself is generated under capitalism as a method of 
social control, rendering certain bodies amenable to governance when they, as members 
of a “dangerous” surplus population, begin to threaten the relations of production. This 
governance becomes especially important during times of economic stagnation. As a way 
of naming this risk, crime provides a balancing function for capital, yet it is not imposed 
on all bodies equally. Instead, the allocation and criminalization of surplus populations 
most often occurs along racial and class lines.
This tension—the desire for surplus labor and the need to keep surplus labor in check 
through its criminalization—is negotiated in and around the global city through the 
production of liminal spaces, such as the archipelago of refugee camps and detention 
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centers noted earlier. Other liminal spaces of governance include inner city public 
schools in the United States and in many metropolises globally (Giroux 2010; 2012), jails 
and prisons (Gilmore 2007; Alexander 2010), the spaces of homelessness and mental 
health (Slate, Buffington-Vollum, and Johnson 2013) and judicial systems (Beckett 1997;
Barak, Leighton, and Flavin 2010). In these spaces the production of surplus populations 
can be monitored and managed, accelerated or stalled, depending on socioeconomic and 
spatial context.
Within the global city the production of racialized deviance is systematized and 
internalized through institutions and practices such as these. A number of studies in the 
United States have shown, for example, how perceptions of a racial threat, manifested in 
places with a high percentage of African Americans, leads to a more punitive system of 
criminal justice and harsher policies in that geographical or institutional arena. In 
education, Welch and Payne (2010) used a national sample of 294 public schools to show 
that schools with a higher percentage of black students were more likely to use extremely 
punitive forms of discipline and to implement policies of zero tolerance. This follows a 
long history in education of producing, identifying, and managing racialized “at-risk” 
students, and then both disciplining and profiting from these identity markers (see
O’Connor, Hill, and Robinson 2009).
Zero tolerance practices in schools were adopted from earlier policies related to drug 
enforcement. It was originally advanced in public education to punish students bringing 
weapons—particularly firearms—to school. However, it quickly grew to incorporate any 
perceived “bad” behavior, including minor forms of social misbehavior such as smoking, 
fighting, threats, bullying, and recreational drug use. To counteract this misbehavior, or 
the possibility of this behavior, schools in areas with a high composition of nonwhite 
students often employed a strong police presence in addition to stricter regulations and 
sanctions. The increased police presence, along with the often extremely harsh 
punishments and decreasing opportunity for administrators to adjust the punishments or 
provide context for the infractions, led to increasing numbers of student suspensions and 
expulsions in the 1990s and 2000s (Giroux 2001; Verdugo 2002; Casella 2003; Carroll 
2008). Statistics show that black students are suspended and expelled more frequently 
than white students by a wide margin (Nichols 2004; Gregory and Weinstein 2008), 
despite the fact that they do not violate school policies at a greater rate than other 
students (Welch 2012).
Research indicates further that suspended and expelled children are predominantly from 
impoverished schools and school districts with high percentages of minority students, and 
once they are removed from the school system, they became more likely to wind up in the 
prison system (Alexander 2010). In this pipeline process it is possible to witness the 
Crime and the Global City: Migration, Borders, and the Pre-Criminal
Page 13 of 31
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 July 2016
formation of “pre-criminal” children through time. These children are constituted as low 
performers by virtue of their residence in particular kinds of impoverished school spaces, 
and these school spaces are then reproduced as failing locations in a mutually 
constitutive process. Moreover, this early positioning leads to further marginalization and 
disenfranchisement, as they cycle in and out of juvenile justice and the wider judicial 
system through youth and adulthood. Their constitution as incipient members of surplus 
populations existing forever on the margins of society is thus initiated in the very earliest 
years and sedimented geographically by their location in particular (neighborhood 
school) spaces.
The connection between risky populations and dangerous urban spaces is not a new 
phenomenon, but it is one that has gained legitimacy through philosophies and practices 
of policing and ideologies of law and order beginning primarily in the early 1990s. These 
are manifested in concepts such as broken windows policing and zero tolerance for urban 
disorder, concepts that grew in power and popularity under Mayor Rudy Giuliani and 
Police Commissioner William Bratton in New York City during these years (Harcourt 
2001).  Subsequently, these ideas and related policies became global phenomena, picked 
up and popularized in cities from Barcelona to Oslo, Dublin, Vienna, Stockholm, Bremen, 
and Sao Paulo. Numerous scholars have investigated how this rhetorical mix of minutely 
orchestrated law and order, revenge and punishment traveled so widely, examining its 
promotion and dissemination in lectures, think tanks, conferences, and by players such as 
Giuliani and Bratton themselves (Smith 2001; Newburn 2002; Belina and Helms 2003;
Jones and Newburn 2007; Mitchell 2011). As Wacquant (1999, 2003), and others have 
noted, the exponential growth and dispersal of these ideas was unquestionably linked 
with the wider dissemination and uptake of neoliberal ideology and policies globally 
during this period.
Law and order discourses such as broken windows and zero tolerance operate on both 
populations and spaces simultaneously as they link specific, geographically located 
populations to disorderly and crime-ridden spaces that are depicted as needing strong 
authoritarian intervention by state forces. There is an important economic dimension to 
these processes as the language of geographic disorder can be used, and frequently is, to 
justify the dispossession of people from those supposedly insecure spaces and associated 
resources. Worldwide, the invocation of chaos and insecurity enables the blurring of 
crime/policing with war/military functions, facilitating the use of harsh, military-type 
responses as well as forms of imperial dispossession of land, housing, and goods at both 
neighborhood and national scales (Harvey 2003; Gregory 2004; Klein 2008; Graham 
2011).
Technologies such as Compstat (the computer-aided use of statistics in mapping crime), 
facilitate the association of risky populations with insecure spaces by identifying crime 
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“hotspots,” which are then targeted for further surveillance and law and order forms of 
authoritarian, so-called predictive policing (Beck and McCue 2009). Although these 
“hotspots” are invariably located in zones of impoverishment, and frequently comprosed 
of minority populations, they are given legitimacy as neutral, “crime-fighting” tools—free 
of any police bias or institutional prejudice—owing to the use of supposedly 
“impersonalized” quantitative data and mathematical algorithms. Nevertheless, these 
types of computer-based tools help lock in and exacerbate the relationship between racial 
formation and spatial formation, as “high-crime” areas with high percentages of minority 
residents become mutually associated, attracting harsher forms of policing for this 
population, including greater “stop and frisk” incidents and trespass admonishments, and 
harsher judicial sentences vis-à-vis posting bond, incarceration rates, and length of 
sentences (Beckett and Herbert 2009; Alexander 2010).
Numerous studies have shown the highly racialized nature of “stop and frisk” incidents, 
where members of minority groups are detained at far higher rates than white 
individuals.  Indeed, this data was integral to the case made by current New York City 
Mayor Bill de Blasio for ending this particular policing tactic. What is less well-known is 
the widespread use of trespass admonishments, which similarly targeted impoverished, 
homeless, and minority groups in cities throughout the United States during the same 
period (Beckett and Herbert 2009; Mitchell 2009). Trespassing zoning is a form of social 
control that operates through banishment; it includes park exclusion laws, drug exclusion 
zones, and generalized restrictions on behavior from lying down in public spaces to 
sitting on a sidewalk.
Trespass laws are critical to investigate because they function in a similar manner to 
many of the forms of social control discussed earlier; that is, they delimit behavior both 
socially and spatially on the basis of status and location—and on acts that are rendered 
criminal before a crime has even taken place. How does this work? Flanagan (2003, pp. 
328–329) writes, “By identifying individuals, either by name or criminal pedigree, cities 
employ ‘people-based zoning,’ making the presence of such individuals in designated 
zones punishable as criminal trespass…. To be apprehended, the excluded individual 
need not engage in criminal activity, nor even be suspected of it. Rather, it is the 
individual’s mere presence in a particular area that offends.” Because of their very 
identity or status as people who have previously offended against public space laws and 
regulations, these individuals can be “trespassed” from those spaces—and others—for 
extended periods of time. Moreover, during the 2000s, numerous cities in the United 
States adopted these types of laws, including Seattle, Portland, Cincinnati, Tampa, 
Richmond, and Knoxville (Flanagan 2003; Goldstein 2003).
Many of the early trespass rules and regulations, such as the SODA (Stay Out of Drug 
Areas) orders, were established to keep people out of areas with a high level of illegal 
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drug trafficking, possession, and use. These types of laws were part of a much larger 
apparatus of crime control and security in the United States, known as the “war on 
drugs.” As the military language indicates, this domestic “war” produced a lot of 
casualties, mainly among the impoverished. Among the many outcomes was a steep 
increase in incarceration rates, from approximately one person out of every thousand in 
the 1970s, to about one out of every 107 people in the adult population by the 2000s.
Numerous recent studies have documented the highly racialized nature of this 
incarceration, with black men, in particular, making up the largest number of inmates per 
percentage of the population. As Alice Goffman (2014, p. xi) notes, “Black people make up 
13 percent of the US population, but account for 37 percent of the prison population. 
Among Black young men, one in nine are in prison, compared with less than 2 percent of 
white young men” (see also Garland 2001; Pettit and Western 2004; Western 2006;
Gilmore 2007; Pager 2007; Wacquant 2009; Alexander 2010).
Broken windows policing, zero tolerance, Compstat, stop and frisk, trespass zoning, and 
mass incarceration all arose as punitive and authoritarian forms of policing and security 
as neoliberal policies and forms of governance expanded globally; this was a period when 
the manufacturing base of many cities was transforming and/or disappearing, urban 
leaders were losing national or federal financial support, and many city actors were 
beginning the shift from managerial to more entrepreneurial and competitive 
philosophies and forms of governance and administration. While these practices are often 
noted and researched in the context of the United States, it is worth mentioning that 
many of them have either been piloted elsewhere initially or have traveled outward 
through both rhetoric and policy, such that this nexus of crime, punishment, and security 
is today a global urban phenomenon (although, of course, with distinctive features 
depending on the specific context). (See for example, the work of Caldeira 2001; Roy 
2002; Wacquant 2003; 2007; Davis 2007; Cacho 2012).
As noted earlier, this was the time when neighborhoods and regions viewed as chaotic, 
dangerous, blighted, or insecure provided both financial opportunities and perceived 
physical and/or financial risks (Weber 2002). If these areas posed impediments to tourist 
activity, capital investment, or the formation of an attractive milieu that might draw 
members of the creative classes, they were seen as risks to the broader entrepreneurial 
strategies of capital accumulation, as well as the related financial instruments and 
institutions measuring and assessing these strategies, such as bond-rating agencies 
(Hackworth 2002). But at the same time these risks could become opportunities—the 
opportunities of urban renovation and gentrification, but only if a neighborhood’s risky 
populations were evacuated, controlled, banished, incarcerated, or otherwise removed or 
rendered surplus. In this section we indicated a few of the tools and technologies of social 
control through which these practices were carried out. In the following section we 
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briefly note some of the experiences and some of the forms of resistance that have been 
adopted worldwide in the face of these neoliberal incursions.
B. Precarity and Resistance
Goffman’s recent book On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City is a sociologist’s 
ethnographic account of the experience of growing up black in a poor, highly segregated 
American city. As the title indicates, one of the main themes is that of perpetual 
criminalization, of the experience of being a fugitive—always on the run from the police, 
various forms of harassment, detention and incarceration, and the judicial system as a 
whole. Goffman’s main informants are young black men in their teens and early 20s, and 
all of them experienced conflict or trauma from one or more of these institutions and 
systems at early points in their lives, causing them to remain forever outside and/or 
oppositional to normative forms of citizenship, politics, or governance. The precarity of 
their lives is evident in the number of times they are subject to violence on the streets, 
and the number of times they are detained, questioned, arrested, and incarcerated by the 
police, as well as their complete lack of opportunity to get a good education or find work 
or employment in the general labor market. Goffman’s account manifests the great 
vulnerability of these men but also their strong friendships, tactics of resistance (e.g., 
“the art of running” from the police), and their rejection of outsiders’ perceptions and 
definitions of their community.
Recent efforts to combat or contain some of the worst forms of harm for vulnerable 
populations such as these have included challenges to the constitutionality of drug laws 
and trespass admonishments, especially the racial disparity in arrests and sentencing. In 
Seattle, for example, the Racial Disparity Project (RDP) started as a grant-funded project 
to reduce racial bias in the criminal justice system, especially the racially 
disproportionate system of drug enforcement. It then evolved into an effective system of 
litigation, community organizing, public education, and legal advocacy for the rights of 
black defendants and communities of color more generally. In a series of litigations from 
2001–2008, the RDP successfully used a selective enforcement motion to dismiss drug 
delivery charges against black defendants, and since then has worked with law 
enforcement on a pre-booking program known as LEAD (Law Enforcement Assisted 
Diversion.) This program, which offers the possibility of direct and immediate access to 
community services rather than jail for individuals caught in low-level drug and 
prostitution offenses, is now being piloted in two downtown neighborhoods in Seattle.
Other strategies and tactics that have arisen to combat the neoliberalization of the city, 
corporate influence, and punitive forms of austerity and crime control that have emerged 
in its wake, include the Occupy movements, beginning in September 2011. Initially 
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starting with the Occupy Wall Street protest movement in Zuccotti Park, in the financial 
district of New York City, these social movements grew and spread globally to other cities 
in North America, as well as to cities in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Europe.
Protesters joined forces under the banner of the 99 percent, primarily opposing the 
growing global social and economic inequalities of recent decades. These Occupy events, 
sit-ins, teach-ins, and other manifestations of civil disobedience were planned and carried 
out at the urban scale, often in local parks and squares, and were coordinated through 
urban networks facilitated by new social media. They were very much “city” protests—
named after cities or parts of cities, and they targeted the corporatism, greed, and 
corruption perceived as emanating from unchecked global market dominance and capital 
accumulation.
In a similar fashion, so-called sanctuary cities, including San Francisco, with which we 
began this essay, have emerged as city-centered forms of protest, once again in reaction 
to larger systems. In the case of sanctuary cities, the opposition is largely to national or 
federal systems of immigration and control that are perceived as either uncaring or 
illegitimate. These urban protest networks include a formal sanctuary city movement in 
the UK (Darling 2010; Squire and Bagelman 2012); numerous informal and formal church 
networks in Germany, Italy, France, and other countries of Western Europe (Just 2013;
Millner 2013); and a wide and diverse group of cities utilizing different tactics and 
strategies of opposition in the United States for over three decades (see, e.g., Coutin 
1995; Leitner and Strunk 2014).
IV. Conclusion
In the global city, with its apparatuses of social control and its position within a supply 
chain network, the boundaries between internal and external security are intertwined 
and mutually constitutive. Since the production of surplus life is often a racialized 
process, such blurring multiplies the technologies and sites through which nonwhite, 
foreign, and/or “pre-crime” bodies are marginalized and exploited. This is why, despite its 
porous boundaries, the global city remains a divided city, with divisions ongoing between 
citizens and foreigners and between the elite and the dispossessed.
These divisions can never be fully resolved, with all crime eradicated and all migrants 
assimilated, because they produce the rationale for ongoing systems of governance. This 
is the contradiction of the criminalized in the global city: to stabilize surplus populations 
they must be produced as problems in need of solutions, yet these solutions can never be 
absolute. Instead, migrants, and others racialized as foreign or different, are increasingly 
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relegated to transitional zones, offshore spaces, and legal quagmires where future risks 
are deferred and life is held in limbo.
K. Jaishankar and Natti Ronel (2013, p. xvi) recently argued that “in a global era where 
criminality becomes global, there is a need for global criminology as well.” But what 
exactly is criminology in this context? For Jaishankar and Ronel, it is part of an “effort to 
study, explore, and reduce global crime” (emphasis added). As a result, the chapters in 
their textbook offer policy advice for combating the international crimes of maritime 
piracy and Islamic terrorism, among others. Such advice remains trapped at the legal 
level, consisting of suggestions for the reform of international law. What makes this 
approach to criminology self-defeating is that it accepts “crime” and “law” at face value, 
failing to interrogate their spatial locations, historical and economic contingencies, and 
conditions of emergence.
Understanding the function of criminality in the global city requires an analysis of social 
and spatial relations. This is also true for international law. Marxist legal theorist Evgeny 
Pashukanis (1987) once argued that the legal form itself is an expression of the violent 
relations of commodity exchange. Under Pashukanis’s commodity-form theory of law, the 
legal relationship is essentially that of the contract: the formal recognition of equal 
subjects (i.e., owners) in the economic sphere of circulation. The paradox is that this 
contract—the exchange of equivalents—requires a coercive force. A commodity can only 
be traded, after all, if it is first possessed as mine. To prevent it from becoming yours, 
violence is implied between participants of any contract (Miéville 2006).
For Pashukanis, this relationship is brokered by the modern state. The latter provides an 
abstract and impersonal third force that mediates and stabilizes the volatile relations 
between equivalent subjects (Miéville 2006). In comparison to domestic law, this would 
make international law a simpler form of the legal relationship, and thus of commodity 
exchange, removed from the supervision of the sovereign. Some aspects of international 
law do, of course, possess a third-party force. Trade agreements and intellectual-property 
law, for example, are maintained through the WTO and its various settlement 
mechanisms. Yet, for human rights law especially, international juridical bodies like the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ) remain limited 
in power and scope (Sparke 2013). In certain spaces of exception—in prison camps, on 
islands where refugees are detained, for example—the usual rules of international (and 
national) law do not apply (Aas 2013).
What this means for the archipelagos of crime and migration discussed previously, where 
sovereign rights are absent or unclear, is that violence in those spaces takes on more 
direct, immediate forms. Alongside a global city increasingly defined by its role in a 
global economy, law (and therefore crime) becomes relegated to a sphere of exchange 
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that extends beyond the borders of the nation-state. This is what enables the legal limbo 
of offshore refugee camps: there is no sovereign third party to enforce rights established 
in the UDHR, the 1951 Refugee Convention, and elsewhere. As a result, the 
socioeconomic tensions that exist within the global city take on amplified and unmediated 
forms at its ghostly periphery.
It would be a mistake, then, to hold out hope for a more effective set of international laws 
to remedy this situation. Given the commodity-form theory of law, legal revisionism can 
only ever defer a deeper contradiction within the legal form itself, which reflects the 
tensions of commodity exchange. No matter how extensive or well-enforced human rights 
may be, as long as the current mode of production remains in place, the migrant and the 
foreigner will continue to be criminalized. Bodies crossing borders or trapped in hotspots 
of criminal activity will still be handled as security risks. And the global city, or whatever 
its offspring, will still be built on the backs of whom it seeks to cast out.
This does not forestall the activity of resistance, however. On the contrary, the 
emergence of the global city has reoriented the strategy, composition, and scale of 
struggles such that the latter appear, increasingly, as struggles over space. This is true of 
events from the Arab Spring, to the occupation of public squares during the “Indignados 
Movement” in Spain and similar anti-austerity efforts in Greece, to recent struggles 
against eviction and gentrification in the San Francisco Bay Area (see Reed, Maharawal, 
Sheppard-Matsuo 2015). While such actions occur in particular places and moments—in 
global cities like Cairo, Athens, and San Francisco—they share a common element: 
resistance to the forces of a global economy that permits certain bodies to occupy spaces 
and cross borders while denying entry for others.
So, although struggles against the criminalization of immigrants remain local, when 
stitched together they constitute a new, transversal geography of resistance—one that is 
scattered and fragmented but that extends across the borders of place and nation. 
Resistance, then, becomes the antithesis of international law: while the latter seeks to 
constrict difference within the antagonisms of criminal and legitimate, plaintiff and 
defendant, today’s revolutionary strategies trace the associations between struggles, 
without reducing them to a single narrative.
We have attempted here to sketch out some of these connections within the global city 
but also between global cities, in the struggles they share in common. In plotting these 
connections and avoiding normative accounts of crime and migration it is important to 
provide semilocal maps of the infrastructure and technologies of capital, and of the 
corridors and boundaries of the world market. For it is through these types of 
mechanisms that the figures of criminal and migrant are produced in the global city. Only 
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by understanding how such mechanisms work—and when and where they fail to work—
are the regimes of criminalization and immigration ultimately challenged and rewritten.
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A more extensive list is included in Einstadter and Henry (2006, p. 238).
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positioned on the threshold (both outside and inside) of human society and politics, 
legally exposed to violence and death through the executive decisions of a sovereign 
authority.
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( ) See, for example, the report, “Analysis Finds Racial Disparities, Ineffectiveness in 
NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Program; Links Tactic to Soaring Marijuana Arrest Rate.” New York 
Civil Liberties Union, May 22, 2013. Accessible at: http://www.nyclu.org/news/analysis-
finds-racial-disparities-ineffectiveness-nypd-stop-and-frisk-program-links-tactic-soar. 
Accessed October 22, 2015.
( ) See the US Department of Justice, “Correctional Populations in the United States, 
2011,” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), p. 1.
( ) For more information about the Racial Disparity Project, see: http://rdp.defender.org/
about. Accessed October 20, 2015.
( ) For a list of Occupy movement protest locations worldwide, see: https://










Crime and the Global City: Migration, Borders, and the Pre-Criminal
Page 31 of 31
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 July 2016
Katharyne Mitchell
University of Washington
Key MacFarlane
University of Washington
View publication stats
